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TAX PRACTICE
Transitioning From GILTI to FDII? Foreign Branch Income Issues
by Jeffery M. Kadet and David L. Koontz
As many tax practitioners know, the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act included several provisions focused 
on foreign income, foreign deductions, tax credits, 
and rules to curtail abuses connected with 
businesses having some type of foreign 
component. By now the new rules have been the 
subject of many articles in tax and economic 
journals. But this new law has much in common 
with prior law — it is complicated, relies heavily 
on complex definitions, and is likely to prove 
difficult to apply. The complexities introduced 
into the law require time-consuming analyses to 
understand its effects and identify opportunities 
so that taxpayers, both large and small, can benefit 
from the law’s new provisions.
The purpose of this article is narrow in scope 
and considers what is needed to better understand 
the benefits and risks associated with a transition 
from global intangible low-taxed income to 
foreign-derived intangible income.
Congress provided a new 37.5 percent 
deduction (21.875 percent for tax years beginning 
after December 31, 2025) for FDII that is effectively 
an export subsidy for products and services. This 
subsidy is an apparent effort to expand exports, 
thereby encouraging U.S. jobs and retaining 
intangible property in, or encouraging its return 
to, the United States. How does this subsidy, 
which requires that income be recorded within 
U.S. corporations, relate to typical international 
structures used by multinationals that commonly 
record income within controlled foreign 
corporations?
As background, in a recent article,1 Benjamin 
M. Willis described FDII and GILTI as two 
separate regimes, despite the respective 
deductions for both being in section 250. He states, 
in part:
FDII and global intangible low-taxed 
income are separate and distinct. They can 
and will apply to different taxpayers.
While integrally related because of common 
structural and definitional features, these new 
provisions each target different taxpayers. As 
Willis states, FDII functions as an export subsidy. 
And consistent with this, the FDII rules apply only 
to some “foreign-derived” income reported by 
domestic corporations and explicitly prohibit any 
benefit from foreign branch income2 earned by 
those corporations. In contrast, GILTI concerns 
only income recorded by foreign corporations that 
Jeffery M. Kadet was in private practice for 
over 32 years, working in international taxation 
for several major international accounting 
firms. He now teaches international tax courses 
in the LLM program at the University of 
Washington School of Law in Seattle. David L. 
Koontz is a retired CPA who spent 25 years 
working in the United States and Asia as a tax 
partner in a major accounting firm. Later he 
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In this article, Kadet and Koontz explain the 
risks and benefits multinationals must consider 
in deciding whether to transition some 
operations conducted within a controlled 
foreign corporation (along with the associated 
income) into a domestic group member to 
achieve a structure that qualifies for foreign-
derived intangible income.
Copyright 2019 Jeffery M. Kadet and 
David L. Koontz. 
All rights reserved.
1
Willis, “GILTI as Charged: FDII Regulations Prove Harmful Tax 
Export Subsidy,” Tax Notes, Mar. 25, 2019, p. 1481. Willis explains that 
section 250 could be seen as creating an illegal export subsidy, and how 
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are CFCs. Under these provisions, the GILTI 
income inclusion imposed on specified U.S. 
shareholders,3 along with its accompanying 50 
percent deduction (falling to 37.5 percent for tax 
years beginning after December 31, 2025) 
applicable to corporate U.S. shareholders and 
electing individuals,4 creates an effective 
minimum tax on that CFC income.
Not only are there different taxpayer targets, 
the applicable IRC provisions indicate that FDII 
and GILTI apply to different transactions and 
businesses. Thus, a domestic corporation will 
only receive FDII benefits from qualifying 
transactions conducted through that corporation’s 
U.S. offices. In the case of GILTI, it applies only to 
a CFC’s income that is earned through its 
operations conducted outside the United States. 
This is because any CFC income that is earned 
through a trade or business within the United 
States and that constitutes effectively connected 
income5 will be directly taxed in the hands of the 
CFC at 21 percent. Any such ECI is excluded from 
GILTI treatment.
These FDII-GILTI differences mean that if a 
domestic corporation and a CFC were to each 
conduct a specific transaction in the same manner 
through efforts of the same personnel in the same 
location, that transaction could not qualify both in 
the hands of the domestic corporation for the FDII 
deduction and also in the hands of the CFC as 
tested income within the GILTI calculation. This 
“same manner,” “same personnel,” and “same 
location” comparison is relevant because of the 
ease with which a multinational can arrange a 
check-the-box election for any CFC, thereby 
converting that entity from a CFC into a 
disregarded entity treated as a branch or division 
of the CFC’s U.S. owner.6
For example, assume that X, a CFC wholly 
owned by its corporate U.S. shareholder (USP), 
sources product P through unrelated contract 
manufacturers and sells this product P to foreign 
customers through efforts of X’s personnel located 
within an office it maintains outside the United 
States. Assume that X is not engaged in any trade 
or business within the United States, meaning that 
X has no ECI. In this case, the income and 
expenses related to these product P sales would 
be included in net CFC tested income.7 Thus, and 
ignoring the effect of any qualified business asset 
investment and assuming zero foreign taxes, USP 
would include in its income an appropriate 
amount of GILTI and be allowed a 50 percent 
section 250 deduction, thereby achieving a 
beneficial 10.5 percent tax rate.
Now assume all facts for USP and X remain 
the same except that a check-the-box election8 had 
been made to cause X to be a disregarded entity of 
USP. Because of this election, all of X’s income, 
expenses, assets, and personnel are treated as 
belonging to USP for U.S. tax purposes. Because X 
personnel within X’s foreign office are responsible 
for generating the product P sales, no FDII 
deduction would be available under section 250 
for these sales. That is because these sales are 
attributable to a foreign branch of USP, the profits 
of which are excluded from deduction-eligible 
income, which is part of the base for the 37.5 
percent FDII deduction.9
Structures Obfuscating Income Generation
In prior articles10 we have postulated how 
some multinationals manage and direct their 
3
“U.S. shareholders” as defined in section 951(b).
4
See part IV of the “Explanation of Provisions” in REG-104464-18, 
released March 4, and prop. reg. section 1.962-1(b)(1)(i)(B)(3).
5
Sections 882 and 864(c).
6
The tax considerations that might arise from any check-the-box 
election, such as potential taxation of appreciated property, are beyond 
the scope of this article.
7




See section 250(b)(3)(A)(i)(VI) and (a)(1)(A). See also prop. reg. 
section 1.904-4(f). Throughout this article, this exclusion from the FDII 
benefit for foreign branch income is referred to as the “foreign branch 
rule.” Note that for a foreign branch to exist for these purposes, section 
989(a) and reg. section 1.989(a)-1 require that there must be a trade or 
business and the branch must maintain separate books and records. 
With this article focusing on disregarded entities, these two factual 
requirements should normally be met, but confirmation of this will be 
necessary.
10
Jeffery M. Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting: The Approach 
Everyone Forgets,” Tax Notes, July 13, 2015, p. 193; Thomas J. Kelley, 
David L. Koontz, and Kadet, “Profit Shifting: Effectively Connected 
Income and Financial Statement Risks,” 221 J. Acct. 48 (Feb. 2016); Kadet 
and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected Partnership 
Status,” Tax Notes, Apr. 18, 2016, p. 335; Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-
Shifting Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 1,” Tax 
Notes, June 27, 2016, p. 1831; Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting 
Structures: Making Ethical Judgments Objectively, Part 2,” Tax Notes, 
July 4, 2016, p. 85; Kadet and Koontz, “Internet Platform Companies and 
Base Erosion — Issue and Solution,” Tax Notes, Dec. 4, 2017, p. 1435; and 
Kadet and Koontz, “Effects of the New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit 
Shifting,” Tax Notes, May 21, 2018, p. 1119.
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worldwide businesses from within the United 
States, and to some extent may operate those 
businesses within the United Sates. Then through 
profit-shifting structures that involve both 
intercompany service agreements and transfers or 
licenses of intangible property to zero- or low-
taxed foreign group members, these foreign 
group members record considerable income that 
is not taxable within the United States. In doing 
so, these multinationals either take the position or 
fail to consider that such income might be ECI 
directly taxable in the hands of these foreign 
group members or that relevant income might be 
caught by subpart F when an applicable foreign 
group member is a CFC.
One of the articles11 included as examples 
situations in which sales to major customers and 
resellers or sales made through internet sales 
platforms involved little or no sales activity 
conducted through an office of the foreign group 
member outside the United States. Rather, the 
sales activities were conducted to a significant 
extent by U.S.-based personnel, either directly 
with such major customers and resellers or 
indirectly through management and decision-
making on product offerings, pricing, and 
contract terms. U.S.-based personnel actively 
managed and maintained on a day-to-day basis 
the internet sales platforms, and made product, 
pricing, and other operational decisions. Another 
example in the article focused on service revenue 
earned through internet platforms that involved 
little or no revenue-generating activities outside 
the United States. That revenue included 
advertising charges for ads directed at website 
users, fees for statistical and other information 
about users, charges for specified cloud services, 
and commissions from the sale or rental of third-
party-owned applications, music, television 
shows, movies, or books.
In those situations, typically the zero- or low-
taxed foreign group member (including its 
disregarded entity subsidiaries) obtains necessary 
support from U.S. group members through 
intercompany service or similar agreements. With 
the U.S. group members ostensibly acting as 
independent contractors, the sales and other 
revenue-generating activities performed within 
the United States are arguably not attributed to 
the foreign group member. This sort of structure 
has the effect of obfuscating which group member 
generates revenue, and where activities that 
generate profits actually take place.12
Why Significant for FDII and GILTI Planning
With the complexity of FDII and GILTI and 
final regulations not expected until mid-2019 or 
later13 (to say nothing of the potential for 
legislative changes), most multinationals may be 
hesitant to execute any restructuring that could 
change income taxable under one regime into 
income that would instead be covered by the 
other regime.
For example, using the USP/X illustration 
above, the group could transform transactions 
currently executed by X that generate GILTI by 
restructuring so that future product P sales are 
made by USP. This could be done alternatively by 
contractually changing the selling entity from X to 
USP, or by merely checking-the-box to make X a 
disregarded entity subsidiary of USP, provided, 
however, that care is taken to ensure that the 
foreign branch rule prohibiting FDII benefits 
would not apply. To avoid application of the 
foreign branch rule, the group would have to 
physically move certain sales activities and other 
key functions out of X’s foreign office and place 
them into USP’s U.S. offices. If these sales 
activities and other key functions remain in X’s 
office outside the United States, the foreign 
branch rule would prevent any FDII benefit.
Over past decades, many multinationals 
implemented tax-motivated structures that 
involved the transfer of intangible property into 
zero- and low-taxed foreign group members, but 
with little or no operational changes. These 
structures relied on the foreign location of the 
intangible property and intercompany service 
and other agreements to contractually support 
11
Kadet, “Attacking Profit Shifting,” supra note 10. See in particular 
examples 4 and 6 regarding product sales. See also Example 7 regarding 
non-sales revenue earned through internet platforms.
12
See Kadet and Koontz, “Profit-Shifting Structures and Unexpected 
Partnership Status,” supra note 10, for specific discussion on how those 
intra-group relationships may be a partnership for U.S. tax purposes, 
thereby causing relevant foreign group members to be engaged in a 
trade or business within the United States under section 875(1).
13
Final GILTI regs were released on June 14, 2019, in T.D. 9866.
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recording profits in these zero- and low-taxed 
foreign group members that would otherwise 
have been recorded in the United States or other 
high-tax jurisdictions. With the advent of the new 
territorial tax system and its section 245A 
dividends received deduction, along with GILTI 
and its less-than-21 percent effective tax rate, it 
would almost always make sense to simply 
continue those existing pre-TCJA profit-shifting 
structures. However, uncertainties are created for 
CFCs and their U.S. shareholders from issues such 
as the severely limited foreign tax credit 
applicable to GILTI and the effect of allocated 
expenses on the GILTI category FTC limitation. 
Thus, it will often make sense to consider whether 
FDII might be a more beneficial alternative.
A first question for any multinational is 
whether restructuring to eliminate GILTI and 
achieve FDII status is possible. In this regard, it 
was noted above that a multinational would have 
to physically move key activities and functions 
out of foreign offices and into the United States to 
avoid the foreign branch rule. As a practical 
matter, in implementing any tax planning or new 
structure multinationals may want to minimize 
required operational changes. Thus, when a CFC 
is earning its profits through real activities and 
functions conducted in its offices outside the 
United States, those activities and functions must 
be moved into the United States; that may be 
operationally difficult to achieve. Or, for other 
good business reasons, management might 
simply veto any restructuring that would require 
meaningful operational changes.
In setting up their profit-shifting structures 
(that is, recording profits in zero- and low-taxed 
group members), some multinationals appear to 
have made few if any operational changes. That 
was possible because the new structures often 
required only a licensing or ownership transfer of 
intangible property and intercompany service 
agreements, often priced on a cost-plus basis. This 
type of planning allowed most real functions to 
remain within the group members that had 
historically conducted them.
Now let’s consider using a check-the-box 
election for a CFC so that its U.S. corporate owner 
would directly report the assets and results of the 
former CFC after the election. Assume that the 
CFC has been part of a profit-shifting structure in 
which the principal activities and functions that 
generated the CFC’s income remained in the 
United States with no such functions being 
conducted by the CFC or its disregarded entity 
subsidiaries. When the check-the-box election is 
made for the CFC, there should not be any need to 
make significant operational changes to obtain 
FDII benefits because the foreign offices do not 
conduct the key activities that generate income. 
Thus, if a multinational in this situation pursues 
FDII benefits in place of the section 245A 
dividends received deduction and the low 
effective rate of tax on GILTI, it should normally 
be easy to transform such a profit-shifting 
structure by merely checking the box for that 
CFC. Likely, little if any operational changes 
would be required because there should be few if 
any activities in foreign offices that would bring 
the foreign branch rule into play.
Assume in such a case that our CFC and its 
disregarded entity subsidiaries performed only 
support or auxiliary functions (for example, 
warehousing and customer support) outside the 
United States in connection with the sale of 
products. To protect against the possibility after 
the check-the-box election is made that the foreign 
branch rule could be asserted (that is, potentially 
causing related sales and service income items to 
be excluded from deduction-eligible income and 
thus not part of the base for FDII benefits), the 
multinational might restructure these activities so 
that they are done by other CFCs or are farmed 
out to third parties. In either case, service or 
similar agreements could be put in place to 
contractually arrange for these services. (Note 
that this paragraph and the following one cover 
transactions between a U.S. group member and 
other taxpayers (that is, group CFCs or third 
parties). This contrasts with the discussion in the 
subsequent two paragraphs that discuss 
disregarded transactions between a U.S. group 
member and its foreign branches, including 
disregarded entities.)
Given the apparent intent of the foreign 
branch rule to encourage activities and 
employment within the United States, future IRS 
audit activity could target structures that 
artificially avoid foreign branch treatment 
through intercompany agreements with group 
CFCs. When only typical support and auxiliary 
©
 2019 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
For more Tax Notes® Federal content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
TAX PRACTICE
TAX NOTES FEDERAL, JULY 1, 2019  61
functions are performed outside the United 
States, there should not be an issue. However, 
when the use of such agreements covers critical 
business functions conducted by group CFCs, 
including, for example, customer negotiations, 
sales functions, or production activities, the IRS 
may find an unacceptable circumvention of the 
foreign branch rule. This could be the likely 
outcome when a foreign group member has wide-
ranging authority to act on behalf of a U.S. group 
member, thereby causing that foreign group 
member to be a de facto agent of the U.S. group 
member. Those activities would then be held to be 
the activities of the U.S. group member, thereby 
creating a foreign branch through which the 
relevant income is generated. As discussed earlier 
in this article, such contractual structuring often 
obfuscates where activities and functions are 
really performed and where income is 
economically earned.
If a multinational chooses, these support and 
auxiliary functions may continue to be performed 
by its former CFC (for which the check-the-box 
election has been made) or its disregarded entity 
subsidiaries in locations outside the United States. 
After that election, the U.S. corporate owner of the 
former CFC is required to treat as foreign branch 
income (which must be excluded from deduction-
eligible income) only the income that reasonably 
relates to these functions. There could be, for 
example, service or other similar agreements 
between the U.S. corporate owner, which earns 
the gross income that qualifies for FDII benefits, 
and the disregarded entity (the former CFC, 
including its disregarded entity subsidiaries), 
which performs the support or auxiliary 
functions. Service fees computed on a cost-plus 
basis may often be supportable. Although these 
service and other similar agreements would 
generally be disregarded transactions for U.S. tax 
purposes, the applicable regulation concerning 
foreign branch income generally respects such 
agreements in determining the respective gross 
incomes of the foreign branch and the branch 
owner.14
For support, auxiliary, or other functions 
performed in offices outside the United States by 
the former CFC, there is an antiabuse rule that 
covers efforts to artificially undervalue the 
contributions and value of the foreign branches, 
thereby overstating the FDII benefits. Specifically, 
the proposed regulations giving FTC guidance 
(REG-105600-18), issued November 28, 2018, 
provide an antiabuse rule for the re-attribution of 
gross income between foreign branches and their 
owners. Although included in prop. reg. section 
1.904-4(f)(2)(v) that generally concerns the FTC, 
this antiabuse rule is expressly applicable to 
inappropriately recorded items of gross income if 
a principal purpose is avoiding the purposes of 
section 250. The antiabuse rule is broadly written 
stating: items of gross income “must be attributed 
to one or more foreign branches or the foreign 
branch owner in a manner that reflects the 
substance of the transaction.” Prop. reg. section 
1.904-4(f)(2)(vi)(E) also provides that disregarded 
payments between a foreign branch and its owner 
must reflect section 482 intercompany pricing 
principles.
Risks Already Present
One situation discussed previously involved 
the transition of an existing profit-shifting 
structure into an FDII-qualifying structure. It was 
noted that in some cases relevant sales, 
production, and other important functions may 
have been conducted in the United States. When 
this is the case, the sought-after FDII benefits 
should not be reduced or eliminated by the 
foreign branch rule. However, while the transition 
may be easy to execute with no significant 
operational changes required, the transition itself 
may highlight potential tax risks for pretransition 
years. This risk will understandably be of interest 
to the IRS, the boards and managements of 
multinationals, and their investors, who should 
be made aware of any significant tax risks of the 
companies in which they invest.
As to how a transition to obtain FDII benefits 
might highlight potential tax risks, assume that a 
U.S. corporation (Parent) wholly owns a CFC 
subsidiary (Sub) that sells products to two 
categories of foreign customers. Parent, from its 
business locations within the United States, is 
largely responsible for soliciting, negotiating, and 
maintaining relationships with major foreign 
customers and resellers, which represent Sub’s 14See prop. reg. section 1.904-4(f)(2)(vi).
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first customer category. Sub also sells directly to 
foreign consumers worldwide (the second 
category) through an online platform with Parent 
personnel managing and operating the platform 
on a day-to-day basis. For these two categories of 
product sales, Sub and its disregarded entity 
subsidiaries perform only limited local logistics 
and customer support outside the United States.
Assume that Parent makes a check-the-box 
election for Sub to cause a loss of CFC status and 
Sub becomes a disregarded entity treated as a 
branch or division of Parent. This transition, 
which required little or no operational changes to 
move functions out of foreign offices and into the 
United States, simply highlights the extent to 
which Sub performed few key activities but 
earned substantial profits in years before the 
transition. Because the key income-earning 
functions were conducted in the United States, the 
prior arrangement may subject the CFC to 
significant U.S. tax exposure. Upon audit of the 
pretransition years, the IRS may find that Parent 
was in fact conducting the Sub’s business, albeit as 
a putative independent contractor under an 
intercompany service agreement. When the facts 
warrant it, the IRS may assert that Sub in those 
pretransition years was engaged in a trade or 
business in the United States, thereby causing any 
ECI to be directly taxable in the hands of Sub.15
This example involves product sales. The 
same issue will be especially acute for many 
internet platform multinationals that earn service 
revenue from advertising, user data, cloud 
services, or selling or renting the products of third 
parties. Assume that a CFC earning such revenue 
relies on its U.S. group members for the day-to-
day management and operation of the group’s 
internet platform, including decision-making on 
terms and pricing. For some significant portion of 
the CFC’s revenue, advertisers and other users 
will access the platform online without any 
involvement of the CFC’s personnel (including 
those of any disregarded entity subsidiaries). 
Further, while tangible product deliveries may 
involve some local warehousing and logistics, 
many if not most advertisers and users access 
services online and typically require no customer 
support from locally based personnel. (An 
exception to this will sometimes be found when 
an internet platform multinational locally solicits 
and services major customers.) Again, when the 
facts warrant it, there may be considerable risk to 
the CFC of being directly taxable on its ECI in 
years before the transition.
It was noted earlier that multinationals may 
be hesitant to transition to FDII structures from 
their current structures that maximize profits 
within their zero- and low-taxed foreign group 
members. One multinational that has not been 
hesitant to do so is Qualcomm, which announced 
that it had made check-the-box elections for 
several of its foreign subsidiaries. In a release 
issued January 30, the company announced, in 
part:
As a result of the Tax Legislation, in the 
first quarter of fiscal 2019, several of our 
foreign subsidiaries made tax elections to 
be treated as U.S. branches for federal 
income tax purposes effective beginning 
in fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2019.
As a result, substantially all of our income 
is in the U.S. and qualifies for the 
preferential FDII tax rate, and the impact 
of GILTI and BEAT [base erosion and 
antiabuse tax] are negligible.
In its disclosure, the company made no 
mention of any operational changes that 
accompanied the check-the-box filings. An article 
in The Wall Street Journal noted:
Qualcomm’s tax savings . . . were 
generated without necessarily moving 
any actual operations. Qualcomm made 
what’s known as a “check the box” 
election on its tax forms, reclassifying 
several subsidiaries from controlled 
foreign corporations into branches of the 
U.S. company.16
Recognizing that operational changes might 
be important, the journalist inquired and reported 
that:
15
See discussion of this in the articles listed in supra note 10. In 
particular, note the discussion in Section II of Kadet and Koontz, “Effects 
of the New Sourcing Rule: ECI and Profit Shifting.”
16
Richard Rubin, “Qualcomm Tax Move Will Save Firm $570 
Million,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 30, 2019.
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Qualcomm wouldn’t say whether the 
company moved any jobs or investments 
in conjunction with the shift.
We have no knowledge of Qualcomm’s 
internal operations and do not speculate on what 
operational or other changes, if any, the group 
may have made to avoid any detrimental effect 
from the foreign branch rule. We also have no 
knowledge of Qualcomm’s pre-check-the-box 
structure that allowed profits to be recorded by its 
CFCs. We merely present this as an example of 
how a transition to an FDII-qualifying structure 
may highlight a need to review prior operations 
for potential ECI in pretransition years.
Effect of Transition on BEAT
Interestingly, the TCJA BEAT regime seems to 
have had little effect on profit-shifting structures 
that involve outbound intangible property 
licensing and other intangible property transfers. 
The reason is that such structuring does not 
normally involve any of the outbound payments 
that are the principal target of the BEAT. If 
anything, such structuring involves inbound 
payments because the foreign group members 
holding intangible property rights and earning 
revenue from customers must pay for the support 
that U.S. group members provide under 
intercompany service and similar agreements.
This situation, of course, will change upon any 
transition to an FDII structure. This is because the 
U.S. taxpayer earning the FDII-qualifying income 
may have to make outbound service fee and other 
deductible payments to foreign group members 
acting as independent contractors. For example, a 
U.S. group company earning sales revenue from 
selling products to foreign customers may pay 
foreign group members for logistical support or 
warranty services that must be performed locally.
Finally, with the 3 percent “cliff” of section 
59A(e)(1)(C) and the potential additional tax costs 
of base erosion tax benefits, any multinational 
contemplating a transition to achieve FDII 
benefits should carefully consider how its BEAT 
status might be affected by any increase in 
outbound related-party payments occasioned by 
the new structure.
Conclusion
It isn’t easy to determine whether a 
multinational should transition to an FDII-
qualifying structure from a structure that involves 
recording profits in zero- or low-taxed foreign 
group members. With the need to assure that the 
FDII foreign branch rule is not violated, it may be 
necessary to move some key income-earning 
operations and functions to the United States. 
Multinationals that try to avoid operational 
changes through intercompany service and 
similar agreements must give careful attention to 
any potential for running afoul of the foreign 
branch rule. Further, when few if any substantial 
income-earning operations have been conducted 
outside the United States in pretransition years, 
an overall analysis may highlight a tax exposure 
for unreported ECI. Finally, such a transition 
could increase outbound related-party payments, 
thereby affecting the multinational’s position 
regarding the BEAT. 
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